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Abstract: NATO’s public diplomacy plays an important role in constituting the alliance’s 
identity in global politics, yet has remained marginal to many scholarly accounts of the alliance. 
This article considers NATO’s increasing footprint in digital diplomacy and the role of 
gendered narratives in shaping it. The central point of analysis is NATO’s ‘story of 
Afghanistan’, told in the web-documentary Return to Hope, which was released to much 
acclaim in September 2014 to coincide with the drawdown of the NATO-led International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan. It finds personal narratives given 
precedence over historical events, key temporal omissions and the silencing of Afghan women. 
As such it provides an important critique of the masculinist protection logic underpinning 
NATO’s efforts, which has served to instrumentalise (Afghan) women and falls short of 
expectations given the alliance’s commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the 
Women, Peace and Security agenda.  
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In September 2014 NATO released an interactive web-documentary, titled Return to Hope, 
which was simultaneously supported by social media content on Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube. The documentary was released to mark the draw down of NATO troops from 
Afghanistan and sought to tell ‘NATO’s story’ of the country (NATO, 2014b). It represented 
a move to a more sophisticated engagement with the web by the alliance, which had previously 
 been described, by former NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (2007), as being 
in the ‘stone age’ when it came to digital diplomacy. Such a development echoed a wider 
engagement with digital platforms across NATO member and partner states militaries, making 
it a now common phenomenon (Crilley 2016: 51). 
 
This article uses Return to Hope as a site for analysis of the gendered nature of NATO’s digital 
diplomacy in respect of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
intervention in Afghanistan. The article makes two key contributions. Empirically, it 
contributes the first in-depth case study of the alliance’s approach to digital diplomacy in 
Afghanistan. This is important because although the use of digital diplomacy by state military 
actors has received increasing scholarly attention, NATO has remained under examined and 
provides an important site for understanding the regional context. Theoretically, it draws 
attention to the importance of a gender sensitive framework for studying public diplomacy in 
order to uncover the way in which hegemonic power structures are constituted through both 
the elevation, and marginalisation, of gendered narratives concerning both ‘low’ and ‘high’ 
politics. In so doing it also makes a key contribution to emerging feminist knowledge of the 
alliance. As the article goes onto argue, Return to Hope is underpinned by a masculinist 
protection logic, which marginalises Afghan women’s stories and agency, and belies NATO’s 
stated commitment to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. 
 
NATO’s engagement with the Women, Peace and Security agenda 
The nature of NATO’s commitment to the WPS agenda, encapsulated in UN Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and the seven follow-up resolutions, is important to understand 
when analysing the alliance’s approach to digital diplomacy. The WPS agenda has been 
perceived as a ‘feminist achievement’ (Cockburn, 2011), given its aspirations and the role of 
 feminist actors in realising its adoption by the Security Council. It recognised for the first time 
that gender is of relevance to the maintenance of international peace and security; including a 
need to improve the participation of women, while also acknowledging the disproportionate 
impact of conflict on women. NATO adopted its first policy on WPS in 2007 (NATO, 2007), 
and in recent revisions the Public Diplomacy Division has been given a role in the alliance’s 
implementation of the agenda. However, until the 2016 revision of the policy, this limited the 
role of the Division to increasing the visibility of NATO’s engagement with the WPS agenda, 
rather than seeking to mainstream gender perspectives into the alliance’s public diplomacy 
initiatives (NATO 2016; NATO 2014a; NATO/EAPC 2014; NATO 2011). Thus for the time 
period when Return to Hope was produced WPS served an instrumental purpose as a public 
diplomacy tool, rather than as a means to support the increased representation of women. 
 
A significant body of feminist work has examined the implementation of the WPS agenda 
across the globe, yet until recently NATO has been omitted from such analysis. In part, this is 
because feminist IR more broadly is grounded in pacifism, which has meant feminist scholars, 
such as Cockburn (2011), assume that the only outcome of NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 
can be a co-option of the agenda, thus failing to account for the possibility of other outcomes. 
This is not to say that feminist scholars have not sought to challenge this notion and use the 
military as a site of analysis, Duncanson (2013: 18), for example, examines feminist debates 
about how militaries and soldiers can be used to support peace. However, attempts to 
conceptualise a feminist theory of NATO have to date been temporally fragmented, and only 
recently has a sustained feminist scrutiny of the alliance begun to emerge (Enloe, 1981, 1983; 
Hurley, 2016; Wright, 2016). This article contributes to that body of work with a consideration 
of the gendered nature of NATO’s digital diplomacy. 
 
 Gendering NATO’s digital diplomacy 
The gendered underpinnings of NATO’s approach to public diplomacy are nothing new. For 
example, in the 1960s, NATO produced a propaganda movie called The Atlantic Decade 
warning of the dangers of Soviet expansion and specifically targeting women, with the narrator 
introducing Turkey by saying ‘here too women have been liberated’ (Risso 2009: 509). Today, 
NATO’s approach to public (and now digital) diplomacy continues to be underpinned by 
narratives, whether they concern individuals, states or the alliance itself. As Wibben (2010: 43) 
argues, narratives are political, they enable and limit representation and these representations 
shape our world and the possibilities within it, challenging the link between ‘experience, 
meaning, and knowledge’. A narrative approach is a useful means to challenge traditional 
conceptions of security concerned with creating meaning and imposing value in what is viewed 
as an ‘anarchic world’ because it makes ‘explicit the operation and production of particular 
kind[s] of meaning, and… draw[s] out the implications this understanding has for human 
existence’ (Polkinghorne 1988: 16 quoted in Wibben 2010: 44). A deconstructive approach 
necessitates consideration of the way they are ‘read, understood and located institutionally’ 
because, for example, the existence of narratives of women in the third world does not 
necessarily equate to a challenge to established hegemonic histories and their subjectivities 
(Mohanty, 1991 quoted in Cooke, 1996: 292).  
 
The mediatisation of war means that the ‘delocalised world’ of TV, newspapers and the internet 
is where battles over ‘legitimacy, effectiveness and consequences are fought’ (Behnke, 2002: 
198). Therefore, understanding NATO’s engagement with digital diplomacy and the narratives 
which underpin it is important, yet NATO’s public diplomacy efforts have been left on the 
margins of scholarly analysis of the alliance. This is significant given that, as Ringsmose and 
Borgesen (2011: 524) argue, in a world of international cooperation and international media, 
 national narratives are not formed in a vacuum. It also leaves work on the use of strategic 
narratives by both governments (Ringsmose and Børgesen, 2011; Jakobsen and Ringsmose, 
2015) and militaries (Crilley 2015; 2016) separated from the wider regional security context. 
The use of digital platforms by governments and military actors is on one level an attempt to 
engage the media and at its most successful this can contribute to the formation of successful 
strategic narratives, which turns the media into a ‘conveyor belt transmitting elite cues to the 
public’ (Jakobsen and Ringsmose, 2015: 217). However, it can also be viewed as a means to 
circumnavigate the traditional dissemination of information through the media in order to 
engage directly with consumers (Crilley 2016: 55). The remit of NATO’s Public Diplomacy 
Division supports both of these purposes, with the division tasked with complementing 
information activities within each member state and addressing issues related to the public 
perception of the alliance (Public Diplomacy Divison, 2006: 333).  
 
The recalibration of NATO’s public diplomacy to engage with digital platforms came in part 
as a result of the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s ability to grab both 
the Afghan and international media’s attention with civilian casualty numbers (Betz, 2011: 
622). To address this issue, NATO created a specific media centre hosted in Afghanistan, the 
web-based NATO TV platform, and appointed Michael Stopford as Deputy Assistant Secretary 
General for Strategic Communication. Stopford had been credited with bolstering Coca-Cola’s 
image and reputation in his previous role as an executive for the company (Castle, 2008). This 
resulted in a change in NATO’s approach to public diplomacy through a shift to direct 
engagement with publics through digital platforms.  
 
The alliance now has a significant digital presence across multiple social media platforms, for 
example, NATO TV (now hosted on YouTube) features short explanatory clips on NATO, 
 NATO’s military capabilities and short documentary style stories, including on Afghanistan. 
NATO TV provides a useful insight into NATO’s approach to digital diplomacy, and while the 
primary video featured on the channel is one detailing what NATO is and why it exists, the 
three most viewed videos across the site are on ballistic missile defence, female prisoners in a 
prison in Heart and the food scene in Kabul (NATO, 2017). This demonstrates that NATO’s 
digital diplomacy strategy is not just concerned with selling NATO and NATO’s ‘hard power’ 
but has utilised more contextualised narratives to inform outreach initiatives. It also draws 
attention to the way gender narratives are utilised to support NATO’s digital diplomacy 
strategy.  
 
The prominence given to women’s stories on the YouTube challenge has been the subject of 
critique, this concerned the alliance’s apparent ‘failure’ to explicitly link a video showing 
Afghan women voting in the 2015 presidential election to the alliance’s (‘hard power’) actions 
to support this (Seib, 2014: 98). However, this analysis misrepresents the purpose of NATO’s 
public diplomacy, where in respect of public information campaigns the intention is not to sell 
‘hard power’, nor to engage in promoting the alliance to individuals already supportive of its 
agenda but rather to permeate a wider audience1. In relation to public diplomacy campaigns 
linked to NATO enlargement in Central Europe, this was also evident, with discussions of 
                                                      
1 Measuring the success of digital diplomacy initiatives is a challenge, particularly as NATO 
does not release audience data, but the fact that governments and NATO continue to support 
them indicates they see value in them. The most popular videos on NATO’s YouTube channel 
have received over 300,000 views (NATO 2017), however, it would be difficult to reliably 
ascertain what audience was being reached given that social media relies on users to populate 
their personal data. 
 NATO framed ‘around the notions of rights, peace, culture, and values’, rather than defence 
(Kuus 2007: 271). As NATO’s Head of Communication has stated, the intention of such 
content is for individuals to be drawn to it not because it is about NATO, but because of the 
issue it addresses (Inside Agency, 2014). In applying feminist analysis it is possible to see how 
gender narratives are instrumentalised by the alliance to support (in this case) a tacit association 
of NATO with women’s rights. This in term reinforces the secondary justification 
underpinning the war in Afghanistan, that the action was taken in order to liberate Afghan 
women (Shepherd, 2006).  
 
The (continued) instrumentalisation of (Afghan) women 
Afghan women have been central to Western involvement in Afghanistan, far predating the 
2001 intervention. Efforts to ‘modernise’ women’s status in Afghanistan go as far back as the 
early twentieth century (Kabeer and Khan, 2014: 5). However, the Western approach to Afghan 
women has been far from consistent, underscoring its instrumentality. For example, during the 
rise to power of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul and the subsequent Soviet occupation 
(1979-1989) efforts were made to emancipate women (Kabeer and Khan, 2014: 1). At this 
time, the US conveniently left women’s rights off the agenda in formulating its opposition to 
Soviet actions, although the US was drawing upon women’s rights to oppose other regimes at 
the time (Enloe, 1989: 57). The selective and instrumental use of women’s rights in US foreign 
policy, was reinforced when the US-backed mujahidin came to power in Afghanistan in 1992 
and ushered in one of the worst periods of human rights abuses the country had seen. The 
subsequent overthrow of the mujahidin in 1994 by the Taliban led to severe restrictions on 
women’s rights, including to movement, work and education (Kabeer and Khan, 2014: 2). As 
Kandiyoti (2007: 505) argues, women’s rights have ‘become implicated in the geopolitical 
 manoeuvrings of powerful global actors’ and this makes the invocation of the ‘principled 
politics solidarity’, which has emerged in the War on Terror, extremely problematic. 
 
The discourse surrounding the US-led intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, and subsequent 
NATO-led ISAF operation has been noticeably gendered. As Messerschmidt (2016: 167) 
identifies, Bush and Obama drew on a masculinist protection logic in their articulations of the 
War on Terror, which constructed a particular gendered villain-victim-hero discourse in order 
to gain support for their actions both globally and regionally. Their speeches constructed the 
hero-villain relationship as unequally gendered, with the hero – the US - occupying a 
hegemonic masculinised position as ‘civilised, virtuous, just and peaceful’; while the 
subordinate masculinised villain – the Taliban - was ‘uncivilised, cruel, unjust, and violent’. In 
contrast, all ‘other’ people in the world were feminised, framed as ‘passively dependent, 
innocent, uniformed, vulnerable and unable to protect themselves’ (Messerschmidt 2016: 169). 
Feminine subordination in the masculinist protection model is not submission, rather it is 
undertaken willingly, with adoration expressed for the protector (Young 2003b: 3). This saw 
Afghan women framed as victims and as such in need of rescue, along with the rest of the 
world.  
 
In November 2001, Laura Bush made history when she became the first First Lady to give the 
President’s radio address, shortly after the start of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom 
intervention in Afghanistan. She drew heavily on the experiences of Afghan women in making 
her case in support of the intervention:  
 Civilized people throughout the world are speaking out in horror -- not only because 
our hearts break for the women and children in Afghanistan, but also because in 
Afghanistan we see the world the terrorists would like to impose on the rest of us (Bush, 
2001). 
The address invoked the emancipation of Afghan women as supplementary to the primary 
justification that the intervention was a necessary defensive action to protect American people 
following the attacks of 9/11 and was framed around the masculinist protection logic. As Cooke 
(2002: 485-486) points out the rationale presented was that to ‘defend our universal civilisation 
we must rescue the women. To rescue these women we must attack these men; These women 
are to be rescued not because they are more “ours” than “theirs” but rather because they will 
have become more “ours” through the rescue mission.’  
 
Following the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan, women became beneficial not just in rhetoric 
but in both doctrine and practice to population centric counter-insurgency (Dyvik 2013: 412). 
This was most visible in the military’s use of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) intended to 
engage local populations. FETs both mirrored essentalised notions of women as peaceful and 
instrumentalised gender as a ‘new strategic asset’, enabling women to engage in the post-9/11 
masculinist protectionist narrative (Pratt, 2013:778). The gendering of counterinsurgency also 
served to demonstrate that the US was ‘no longer fighting its new battles with outmoded 
methods’ (Mcbride and Wibben, 2012: 200). FETs were a new initiative but as one member of 
a FET later reflected ‘we were tourists, unable to solve problems with units that changed every 
12 months. Everything was temporary, except Afghanistan’ (Pope, 2016).  
The preoccupation of the Western interveners with ‘rescuing’ Afghan women has both 
imperialist undertones and political implications (Khan, 2013: 105). The centrality of Afghan 
 women to the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan has pervaded every element of the 
intervention, with public diplomacy and strategic communication no exception. This is 
exemplified in a classified CIA document released through Wikileaks (2010) which notes:  
Afghan women could serve as ideal messengers in humanizing the ISAF role in 
combating the Taliban because of women's ability to speak personally and credibly 
about their experiences under the Taliban, their aspirations for the future, and their fears 
of a Taliban victory. Outreach initiatives that create media opportunities for Afghan 
women to share their stories with French, German, and other European women could 
help to overcome pervasive scepticism among women in Western Europe toward the 
ISAF. 
There are parallels between the CIA statement and the strategy later pursued in Return to Hope, 
as this article goes onto discuss. The important point to note here is that this draws attention to 
a paradox in Western approaches to Afghanistan, where the ‘the over-determination of gender 
in addressing [or instrumentalising] the suffering of Afghans has led to an impasse, thereby 
creating the conditions of impossibility for acknowledging this very suffering’ (Daulatzai 
2008: 428). 
There is a further cost to focusing on Afghan women to explain ‘the people, the land, and the 
nation-state of Afghanistan’ (Mackie 2012: 118), it means that they can only be perceived as 
women in Afghanistan and are denied agency. Moreover, the focus on Afghan women as 
victims of their culture makes a spectacle of them and intensifies stereotypes about the Third 
World, and in particular, Islam (Khan, 2013: 107). As Butler (2004: 143) argues it is necessary 
to exercise caution before championing the ‘liberated’ faces of Afghan women and ‘to ask in 
what narrative function these images are mobilised’ (Butler, 2004: 143). In doing so, it is 
possible to uncover the contradiction between the apparent humanisation of these women and 
 their simultaneous dehumanisation through the denial of their experience of decades of 
suffering in conflict. These same considerations need to be applied to the use of Afghan 
women’s stories by NATO. 
NATO’s story of Afghanistan: Return to Hope 
Fifteen years prior to the production of Return to Hope, NATO’s public diplomacy strategy in 
Kosovo drew on narratives and metaphors which served to move responsibility away from 
NATO for the death and destruction, and to designate Milosevic as ‘evil’, thus upholding 
NATO’s moral legitimacy as the enforcer of humanitarian values (Behnke 2002: 136). Return 
to Hope offers an interesting analogy to this in respect of Afghanistan, however, unlike 
NATO’s real time response to the unfolding events in Kosovo, the documentary offers a static 
reflection to commemorate NATO’s ‘journey’ in Afghanistan. The analysis presented here 
interrogates the tropes used to confer NATO’s moral legitimacy, including the designation of 
the Taliban as ‘evil’ through the use of select gendered narratives, and the articulation of a 
masculinist protection logic. 
 
Return to Hope is a web-documentary, primarily hosted on a website but with components also 
shared on social media, including YouTube, Twitter and Facebook, making it both flexible and 
adaptable as a digital diplomacy tool to tell NATO’s story of Afghanistan. The documentary 
represents a sophisticated use of the web, utilising web 2.0 to best effect. It has its own URL 
(www.returntohope.com) and is not immediately identifiable as a NATO project beyond the 
full title appearing briefly as the loading video plays: ‘Return to Hope: NATO’s Journey in 
Afghanistan’. The distinctive blue NATO logo has been shrunk and toned down to a muted 
sand colour to complement the dusty pictures of Afghanistan in the background, and the 
‘compelling human stories’ told by six individuals take prominence (NATO, 2014b). The story 
presented is largely a homogenised ‘NATO’ experience, although where NATO soldiers are 
 featured they are predominantly American, except for under the section titled ‘The Fight’, 
which details individual state contributions.  
The focus on using individual stories draws parallels with the leaked CIA memo discussed 
above which called for a strategic communication programme to engage publics back home 
through the stories of Afghan women (CIA [Wikileaks], 2010). As Chris Riley, Principal Editor 
in the Public Diplomacy Division explains the intended audience for Return to Hope was: 
not Afghanistan followers, they’re not experts, and they’re not people who are 
necessarily politically active. They [the intended audience] are those people who may 
have seen that Afghanistan has been on the news over the last few years and maybe 
have a vague view but are interested in personal compelling stories and that through 
that storytelling we interest them in the subject (Inside Agency, 2014). 
The focus of NATO’s efforts are therefore on storytelling, rather than in engaging in broader 
debates about Afghanistan among people knowledgeable of the country. This supports 
NATO’s contention that successful digital content builds an emotional connection with the 
consumer (Voves, 2015). The story the Public Diplomacy Division identifies that people will 
care about is not one of the ‘high politics’ of ISAF, nor of NATO’s ‘hard power’ military 
capabilities but that of six individuals. In this respect it is ‘NATO’s story’ only in the sense 
that it is NATO dictating the parameters of the narrative. 
The stories of the six individuals featured on the landing page are the focus of the documentary, 
they have either lived or served in Afghanistan, their stories are not told on their own merit but 
included because they can be related to the broader narrative surrounding NATO’s involvement 
in Afghanistan. The first three individuals featured are: Nancy Dupree, the ‘Grandmother of 
Kabul’, an American who moved to Afghanistan with her husband in the 1960s; Josh Pitcher, 
‘The Wounded Warrior’, an American hero who made a miraculous recovery after being 
 injured in service; and Roya Mahboob, ‘The Entrepreneur’, who returned to Afghanistan after 
her family fled Taliban rule. The next three are: Ahmad Sarmast, ‘The Music Maker’, an 
Afghan who left the country in the 1980s and was unable to return when the Taliban took 
power; Mohammad Ali, ‘The Commando’, part of an elite unit in the Afghan army; and Mujeeb 
Arez, ‘The TV Star’, who had lived in Kabul under the Taliban. All the individuals’ stories 
have one thing in common, their lives changed when they encountered the ‘evil’ Taliban. For 
the Afghans featured this meant either leaving their country and seeking refuge in neighbouring 
states or lying low until it was safe to resume their lives in Afghanistan (following the 2001 
intervention), serving to support NATO’s role as a masculinist protector.  
The American soldier’s story is presented differently from the others, beginning with the heroic 
triumph of his exceptional return to the field after a life-changing injury at the hands of the 
Taliban. As his story narrates: ‘Lieutenant Josh Pitcher was not most soldiers. Quitting wasn’t 
an option for him – he never allowed himself to consider it for a moment’ (NATO, 2014b). 
Pitcher’s return to duty is seen as ‘exceptional even for a soldier’ and he is described as a 
‘stronger, fitter, better soldier’ as a result of losing his foot. The presentation of Pitcher’s story 
reinforces the notion that military masculinity is as much about performance, as it is about 
action (Partis-jennings 2017: 3). The masculinised heroic qualities he is framed as embodying 
construct a particular form of masculinist protector logic. We are told that Pitcher remains 
focused on his mission and ensuring the safety of his men, in spite of his life changing injury. 
He is framed as a hero who has the agency to change his situation and to triumph over the 
villainous Taliban.  
The personal triumph narrative underpinning Pitcher’s story stands in contrast to Roya 
Mahboob, Ahmad Sarmast, Mohammad Ali and Mujeeb Arez’s stories, where they are denied 
 agency – their latter success is predicated upon the Western intervention in Afghanistan. As 
Ali’s story tell us:  
The Taliban was now in control. Although things were relatively calm, Mohammad Ali 
remembers it as a dark time, both for his own family and for the country as a whole. 
But dark times were nothing new for Afghanistan. Before the Taliban came to power 
there had been the civil war. Before the civil war there had been the Soviet occupation. 
[emphasis in original] (NATO 2014b) 
Here the hero-villain-victim relationship, also evident in Bush and Obama’s speeches, is 
articulated, with the villain masculinity subordinate to that of the hero (Messerschmidt 2016: 
169). The hero, NATO, has freed the victims, Afghan people, from the villain, the Taliban, but 
also from themselves. Western intervention is presented as a necessary civilizing mission to 
enable Afghans to gain control of their lives, which it is tacitly implied they are incapable of 
doing themselves.  
A timeline of progress 
In addition to the individual stories featured, a timeline is included among the nine thematic 
chapters. This seeks to place NATO’s intervention in temporal perspective and suggests 
progression, so its inclusion warrants an examination from where, and to what end. The 
timeline dates back to the 1973 coup overthrowing King Zahir Shah and thus represents a 
significantly condensed history of Western involvement in Afghanistan. For example, there is 
no reference to the British wars in Afghanistan dating back to 1839. The next date featured is 
1978, which is described in just two sentences: ‘Saur Revolution communist takeover. Daud is 
killed and replaced by communists close to the Moscow leadership’. The narrative presented 
is a simple one and can be read against NATO’s role as a Cold War alliance. The 1978 section 
also notes that this is when Nancy Dupree (one of the six individuals featured on the landing 
 page) was expelled from Afghanistan. We are given far more information about her story than 
that of the communist takeover, with an embedded video and an invitation to ‘read more’. This 
places her narrative (as an American woman) as more important to ‘NATO’s story of 
Afghanistan’ than the broader political-historical context of the state NATO is intervening in.  
For 1979 and 1983, the next two time periods featured, we see a similar pattern of individual 
narratives taking priority over issues of political importance. The Soviet invasion of 1979 is 
mentioned in one sentence, as if it requires no further explanation or comment, while the story 
of Dr Ahmad Sarmast (the fourth individual highlighted) also invites us to ‘read more’. In a 
similar pattern, 1986 - the birth of the sixth person featured, Mujeeb Arez – is given prominence 
over the 1989 withdrawal of Soviet troops. As Mamdani (2002) notes, accounts of political 
outcomes have a tendency to dehistoricise issues and by focusing on cultural aspects, including 
through ‘authentic’ individual narratives, overlook the issue of power. In placing narratives in 
a broader historical perspective it is possible to expose their political underpinnings (Wibben 
2010: 45). 
The next section in the timeline acknowledges the start of the Afghan civil war in 1992 before 
moving to focus on the rise of the Taliban, pinpointing this to 1994. It again provides a 
superficial and simplistic account of Afghanistan’s history. In doing so, Return to Hope 
overlooks the CIA’s creation of the mujahidin and embrace of both Bin Laden and the Taliban 
and frames contemporary Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ as a traditional cultural leftover, rather 
than a modern political project resulting from an imperial encounter (Mamdani 2002: 772). 
The timeline then turns to make the first mention of Afghan women, through the story of the 
third individual Roya Mahmoob, who we are told ‘fled the brutal Taliban regime’. This sets 
the scene for the broader narrative surrounding the US intervention in Afghanistan in support 
of women’s emancipation but overlooks the culpability of the US in supporting the mujahidin’s 
 rise to power in 1992. For example, at the time the US government ignored feminist calls to 
put pressure on the Taliban government over women’s rights (Young 2003b: 18).  
For 2001, the timeline is unsurprisingly at is most populated given its significance to the War 
on Terror. Here, the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in March 2001 by the Taliban leads 
directly onto the attacks of ‘9/11’ on the US. This reproduces the broader construction of the 
Taliban as ‘evil’, and implicated in 9/11. The next entries on the timeline all detail progress, 
from ISAF’s expansion, to a major defeat for the Taliban and the establishment of a NATO 
training mission. From 2010 onwards the timeline focuses on the theme of transition, 
culminating in the presidential elections and ISAFs withdrawal in 2014, following on from the 
‘death of Bin Laden’ in 2011. The final entry is for a NATO training mission to ‘advise’ and 
‘support’ Afghan forces starting in 2015. The latter part of this history seamlessly overlooks 
the difficulties NATO faced in one of its most challenging and drawn out interventions to date. 
Where are the women? 
In considering the prominence of Afghan women to Western understandings of Afghanistan, a 
‘feminist curiosity’ (Enloe, 2004) necessitates asking where are the women in Return to Hope? 
It would seem to follow from the role of NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division in implementing 
the WPS agenda, that women would be given a central role, however, of the six individuals 
given prominence on the landing page, just two are women and only one is an Afghan woman. 
In part, this reflects the very real dangers women in Afghanistan face if they are seen to be 
working with the intervening forces. This probably led NATO – somewhat ironically, if NATO 
is to be understood as a liberating force - to avoid featuring identifiable Afghan women in order 
to protect their security. The issue of just how representative the experiences of those portrayed 
in the documentary are, particularly for women is a pertinent one. For example, the Afghan 
woman featured, Roya Mahboob, was not brought up in Afghanistan as her family fled when 
 the Taliban took power. Mahboob’s story portrays her as a victim of the ‘evil’ Taliban, only 
able to return to her home following NATO’s intervention and frames NATO in a masculinist 
protector role. This aligns more readily as a continuation of the instrumentalisation of Afghan 
women by the West to support a justificatory narrative for intervention, rather than one 
supportive of women’s greater participation in line with the WPS agenda. 
In the nine thematic chapters, much of the narrative is weaved from the individual stories 
featured on the home page, however, the section title ‘women’s struggle’ warrants particular 
attention for the purpose of this analysis. This section appears to be the Public Diplomacy 
Divisions’ attempt to ensure WPS is integrated into all public diplomacy efforts, which at this 
time was measured through the ‘number and scope of public diplomacy efforts including 
website and NATO TV Channel stories’ (NATO/EAPC, 2014), rather than the substance of 
such efforts2. The ‘women’s struggle’ section opens with a quote: 
Under the Taliban, Afghan women were deprived of basic human rights, education and 
the right to work. Much has changed since then. Many women have seized the new 
opportunities created for them. But life is still a struggle for Afghan women. (NATO, 
2014b) 
This supports Young’s (2003b: 4) conception of the seemingly more benign masculinist 
protection logic, where the feminine woman has adoration for her protector in the return for 
the promise of security, and is constituted as a worthy subject through his willingness to take 
risks for her. The final section details the challenges left to achieving women’s full 
participation in Afghan society, specifying the particular difficulties of instigating change 
                                                      
2 As previously noted, the 2016 NATO/EAPC Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 goes further than 
just a ‘tick box’ exercise for measuring the integration of WPS in public diplomacy. 
 within a ‘patriarchal society’ (NATO, 2014b). The viewer is left with a sense that there is 
something intrinsic to Afghanistan, which makes it impossible for the West to truly liberate 
Afghan women. Moreover, even if it were possible, through what lens would Afghanistan be 
understood by the West if not through Afghan women’s suffering given its over determination 
in both rhetoric and practice.  
The ‘work ahead’ section within the ‘women’s struggle’ theme features interviews with a 
number of individuals who contribute to telling Afghan women’s story. It is significant to note 
that five of the nine individuals featured separately are Afghan women, although only two (both 
MPs) are named in the videos themselves3, with the other three left nameless. The two Afghan 
women MPs (who are named) are asked about the broader political situation. Amina Afzali is 
interviewed about the significance of the 2001 Bonn Conference for Afghan women, having 
been one of the delegates. The other, Farkunda Naderi, speaks about the 2014 Afghan elections. 
This selective history is intriguing because it overplays the significance of the Bonn 
Conference for women’s rights, where the provisions for the participation of Afghan women 
fell short of those demanded by Afghan civil society (Charlesworth and Chinkin 2002: 603). It 
also omits to mention the 2012 NATO Chicago Summit, which was a critical space for deciding 
Afghanistan’s future. This is because at the same time as NATO was reaffirming its 
commitment to WPS at the summit, Afghan women were conspicuous by their marginalisation. 
Afghanistan’s President Karzai’s initial delegation was comprised solely of men before a last 
                                                      
3 The principle of the school featured in one of the videos is not given a name plate in the 
video clip itself, however, her first name (only) does feature in the brief text descriptor of the 
video. If the video is viewed as a feature in itself on another social media platform, she is 
effectively nameless, and regardless is given a lesser status than the man whose full name is 
included on a name plate.  
 minute adjustment ensured two women participated, following lobbying by Afghan civil 
society and Amnesty International (Afghan Voice Agency, 2012). The absence of Afghan 
women from the table deciding the future of their country, was made visible by a shadow 
summit organised by civil society, in which Afghan women participated alongside former US 
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright and US Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s 
Issues, Melanie Verveer (Amnesty International, 2012). 
Of the unnamed Afghan women featured in the ‘work ahead’ section, we learn that one is a 
school principle and the other two are local women who outline the struggles they face in their 
day-to-day lives. The omission of their names is not for security reasons, given that the film 
features their faces prominently. The other contributors include the Swedish Ambassador and 
Croatian Gender Advisor to ISAF. The prominence of the Swedish Ambassador is in one sense 
surprising, given that Sweden is not a NATO member4 (and this is ‘NATO’s story’), however, 
it draws attention to the external facing nature of NATO’s commitment to WPS (and gender 
issues) with Sweden given a prominent role in supporting the WPS agenda at NATO (Wright, 
2016: 356). We also hear from an Afghan man, Wadood Pedram, in three separate film clips, 
where he addresses his role as a women’s rights activist, the patriarchal nature of Afghan 
society and the progress for Afghan women over the previous 13 years. In contrast to two of 
the three unnamed Afghan women, Pedram is allowed to address broader substantive issues, 
whereas the story we hear from the two women in Herat is of their lived experience. He is also 
given a name (and job title), elevating his status above the Afghan women. The other individual 
we hear from is Samina Ahmed, who works for an international NGO. She is featured three 
times, first talking about life for Afghan women under Taliban rule, then on the changes for 
Afghan women in society and finally detailing what progress is needed. It is therefore a man 
                                                      
4 Sweden is a NATO partner and troop contributor to the ISAF mission.  
 and an international observer who are given the most central role in detailing the work ahead 
in respect of Afghan ‘women’s struggle’ and are positioned as experts on the topic. Although 
Afghan women are included in the documentary, the showcasing of these two individuals 
serves to side-line their contribution. This highlights the importance of asking not just whose 
stories are told but how they are included and understood. 
Conclusion 
Return to Hope represents a move to a more sophisticated approach to digital diplomacy by 
NATO. The analysis presented here contributes an important case study on the role of public 
diplomacy in the alliance’s identity construction, something which has remained on the 
margins of NATO scholarship. It provides the first in-depth evaluation of the use of digital 
diplomacy by an international security institution, and a useful addition to work focused on 
national military actors. This in turn adds to the growing body of feminist scholarship on the 
alliance, and in so doing demonstrates the importance of a gender sensitive analysis for 
unpacking both the practice and narratives underpinning digital diplomacy. 
The analysis presented here demonstrates that NATO’s approach to digital diplomacy is not 
just concerned with selling the alliance’s ‘hard power’ capabilities and that the alliance takes a 
more sophisticated approach to reaching target audiences. The focus on individual narratives, 
even when discussing broader issues – such as women’s rights – serves to depoliticise NATO’s 
story of Afghanistan. This draws attention to the necessity of contextualising individual 
narratives within the wider framework in which they are presented. In addition, the temporal 
focus to the documentary gives an impression of progress and triumph for NATO and is 
supported through the omission of key historical events, which may not appear as glaring 
omissions to a target audience unfamiliar with Afghanistan. The result is that the Afghan 
 experience is presented in Return to Hope as one of feminised victimhood but also contingent 
empowerment by NATO, and thus supportive of the masculinist protection logic.  
In taking the long view of Western intervention in Afghanistan, and the centrality given to 
Afghan women to interpret the country, it is possible to understand their place in NATO’s 
digital diplomacy. Afghan women are both marginalised from Return to Hope and given 
prominence in the ‘women’s struggle’ section. There is little consideration given to their 
representation outside of this section and this undermines NATO’s broader commitment to 
WPS, while remaining in line with NATO’s ‘tick box’ approach at this time. This saw WPS 
utilised as a public diplomacy tool to engage publics, rather than as a means to support the 
representation and participation of women in international peace and security. So while the 
integration of WPS considerations into public diplomacy initiatives should be welcomed, 
attention needs to be given to the ways in which this is realised. 
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